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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper considers the welfare and distributional 
consequences of higher relative food prices in rural India 
through the lens of a specific-factors, general equilibrium, 
trade model applied at the district level. The evidence 
shows that nominal wages for manual labor both within 
and outside agriculture respond elastically to increases in 
producer prices; that is, wages rose faster in rural districts 
growing more of those crops with large price run-ups over 
2004–09. Accounting for such wage gains, the analysis 
finds that rural households across the income spectrum 
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benefit from higher agricultural commodity prices. 
Indeed, rural wage adjustment appears to play a much 
greater role in protecting the welfare of the poor than the 
Public Distribution System, India’s giant food-rationing 
scheme. Moreover, policies, like agricultural export bans, 
which insulate producers (as well as consumers) from 
international price increases, are particularly harmful to 
the poor of rural India. Conventional welfare analyses 
that assume fixed wages and focus on households’ net 
sales position lead to radically different conclusions.
Food Prices, Wages, and Welfare in Rural India
Hanan G. Jacoby∗
Keywords: Agriculture, Trade, Specific-factors Model, General Equilibrium
JEL codes: Q17, Q18, F14
Sector Board: POV
∗Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, Development Research Group, The World Bank. E-mail:
hjacoby@worldbank.org. I am grateful to David Atkin, Madhur Gautam, Denis Medvedev, Rinku Murgai,
Maros Ivanic, Will Martin, and Vinaya Swaroop for useful suggestions and to Maria Mini Jos for assistance
in processing the data. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper are mine and should not
be attributed to the World Bank or its member countries.
1 Introduction
Elevated food prices over the last half decade have provoked a rash of government interven-
tions in agricultural markets across the globe, often in the name of protecting the poor. Of
course, it is well recognized that many poor households in developing countries, especially
in rural areas, are also food producers and hence net beneficiaries of higher prices.1 Even
so, there is another price-shock transmission channel, potentially more important to the
poor, that has received far less attention in the literature: rural wages.2 To what extent
do higher agricultural commodity prices translate into higher wages? For rural India, home
to roughly a quarter of the world’s poor (those living on less than $1.25/day), the answer
to this question can have momentous ramifications. After all, the vast majority of India’s
rural population relies on the earnings from their manual labor, most of which is devoted to
agriculture.3 Any thorough accounting of the global poverty impacts of improved terms of
trade for agriculture must, therefore, confront rural wage responses in India.
Aside from direct income effects for consumers and producers, as in the textbook partial
equilibrium analysis (e.g., Singh, Squire, Strauss, 1986, Deaton, 1989), higher agricultural
prices, in principle, induce three types of indirect, or general equilibrium, effects concomitant
with higher wages: (1) higher labor income; (2) lower capital (land) income due to higher
labor costs; (3) higher prices for nontradables. To account for these channels in a manner
that is both theoretically coherent and transparent, I integrate a standard three-sector,
specific factors, general equilibrium model of wage determination (Jones, 1971,1975) into
an otherwise conventional (first-order) household welfare change calculation.4 I use this
1Ivanic et al. (2012), Wodon et al., (2008), and World Bank (2010a) provide recent multi-country assess-
ments of the the welfare impacts of food price increases accounting for such producer gains.
2Ravallion (1990) surveys the debate in development on the nexus between the intersectoral terms of
trade and poverty. Shah and Stiglitz (1987) provide an early theoretical treatment. In their cross-country
study, Ivanic and Martin (2008) incorporate price-induced changes in wages for unskilled labor derived from
nation-level versions of the GTAP computable general equilibrium model.
3Indeed, rising wages are seen as the major driver of rural poverty reduction in recent decades (Datt and
Ravallion, 1998; Eswaran, et al. 2008; Lanjouw and Murgai, 2009).
4Porto (2006) (and subsequently Marchand, 2012) comes closest to my approach in the context of trade
liberalization, but differs in some important details. Primarily, he keeps the general equilibrium model, in
his case applied to the country as a whole, in the background of the analysis.
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generalization of Deaton (1989) to examine the distributional impacts of higher agricultural
prices in rural India.
Appealing to the widely noted geographical immobility of labor across rural India,5 I
apply the specific factors model at the district level, treating each of these administrative
units for theoretical purposes as a separate country with its own labor force but with open
commodity trade across its borders.6 Thus, I allow that the elasticity of the rural wage with
respect to an index of agricultural prices is not a single number for India as a whole, but
varies with the structure of the particular (district) labor market. Moreover, under certain
assumptions on the technology and preferences, I obtain a readily interpretable closed-form
solution for this elasticity as a function of parameters that I can easily calculate from micro-
data.
My empirical analysis shows that nominal wages for manual labor across rural India
respond elastically to higher agricultural prices. In particular, wages rose faster in the
districts growing relatively more of the crops that experienced comparatively large run-ups
in price over the 2004-5 to 2009-10 period. Moreover, the magnitude of these wage responses
is broadly consistent with a specific-factors model in which labor is perfectly mobile across
production sectors. Indeed, I also explore a version of the theoretical model in which
labor markets are segmented so that workers cannot shift from agriculture to the services
or manufacturing sectors. This alternative labor market assumption turns out to have
significantly different welfare implications in the Indian context than the unsegmented case.
Fortunately, it has different empirical implications as well: Under labor market segmentation,
nonagricultural wages (for manual labor) respond to changes in agricultural prices with a
5See, e.g., Topalova (2007, 2010), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009), and World Bank (2010b). Kovak (2011)
applies a specific-factors model to sub-national units in Brazil, a country with much greater geographical
labor mobility than India. Despite incorporating cross-regional labor migration over an entire decade into
his empirical strategy, it turns out not to matter for local wage responses to trade reform.
6In this framework, capital (land, in agriculture) is also assumed immobile across both districts and
production sectors. Mussa (1974) was perhaps the first to argue that the Stolper-Samuelson theory, with
its assumption of perfect factor mobility, is inadequate for analyzing the relevant distributional effects of
commercial policy. This is true a fortiori in the context of food price “crises”, where long-run welfare
considerations play virtually no role in the policy debate.
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relatively low elasticity, as intersectoral spillovers are muted, if not nugatory. The evidence,
however, is inconsistent with this strong form of segmentation.
Existing studies of the relationship between agricultural commodity prices and rural
wages are based on aggregate time series data from countries that were effectively autarkic
in the main food staple (pre-1980s Bangladesh in Boyce and Ravallion, 1991, and Rashid,
2002; the Philippines in Lasco et al., 2008), thus raising serious endogeneity concerns. A
closely related and much larger literature based on micro-data considers the labor market
effects of trade liberalization (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007, for a review).7 My estimation
strategy follows the “differential exposure approach” employed in studies of the local wage
impacts of tariff reform (most recently in Topalova, 2010, McCaig, 2011, and Kovak, 2011).
Instead of considering the interaction between changes in industry protection rates and local
industry composition (as in these papers), I exploit the huge variation across Indian districts
in the crop composition of agricultural production coupled with differences in the magnitude
of wholesale price changes across crops. Of course, price changes observed in local domestic
markets cannot be treated as exogenous and must be instrumented for.
In rural India, the elastic rural wage response to changes in agriculture’s terms of trade
has striking distributional implications. Higher food prices, rather than reducing the welfare
of the rural poor as indicated by the conventional approach, which ignores wage impacts,
would actually benefit both rich and poor alike, even though the latter are typically not net
sellers of food.8
In the next section, I sketch the theoretical framework and develop my empirical testing
strategy. Section 3 discusses the econometric issues and the estimates. Section 4 derives
and implements the welfare elasticity formulae, paying particular attention to the role of
India’s vast Public Distribution System, which rations food staples to the poor. The price-
7Topolava (2010) and Marchand (2012), among others, consider the reduced-form wage and poverty
impacts of India’s broad-based trade liberalization of the 1990s. However, these studies do not isolate the
effects of a change in the relative price of food.
8To be sure, the increase in rural wages may lag the increase in consumer prices, and so the conventional
analysis may be more appropriate for the very short run. This paper does not speak to the timing issue.
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shock buffering impact of this program provides a useful comparator to that of rural wage
adjustment in general equilibrium. I conclude, in section 5, with a discussion of the Govern-
ment of India’s responses to the 2007-08 food price spike, notably its export ban on major
foodgrains.
2 Framework
2.1 A general equilibrium model
Consider each district as a separate economy with three sectors: agriculture (A) and man-
ufacturing (M), both of which produce tradable goods, and services (S), which produces a
nontradable. Output Yi in each sector i = A,M, S is produced with a specific (i.e., immobile)
type of capital Ki, along with manual labor Li and a tradable intermediate input Ii. In the
case of agriculture, KA is in fact land and IA is, e.g., fertilizer. Manual labor is perfectly
mobile across sectors but its supply is fixed at L = LA +LM +LS within each district (later,
I reconsider the first of these assumptions). Nonmanual labor is assumed to be exogenously
fixed for simplicity.9
To deal with multiple crop outputs Y1, ..., Yc, let YA = G(Y1, ..., Yc), where the product
transformation function G is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. A price index PA
thus exists such that PAYA =
∑c
j=1 PjYj, which upon differentiation yields
P̂A =
∑
j
sjP̂j (1)
where “hats”denote proportional changes and sj is the value share of crop j.
Now let W be the nominal wage for manual labor and PM and PS be the prices of
manufactures and services, treating the former output price as fixed so that manufactures
9In rural India, as we will see, nonmanual labor accounts for only 17 percent of employment days, though
a considerably larger portion of household income. The exogeneity assumption can be motivated by thinking
about nonmanual labor as requiring a higher level of education, which cannot be obtained in the short-run.
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is the numeraire. Similarly, I take the price of all intermediate inputs as fixed. Finally, let
ΠA be the average return on land.
10 Given that farmers are price-takers in all markets, we
have (from price equals unit cost)
αLŴ + αKΠ̂A = P̂A (2)
where, under constant returns to scale, the input cost shares in agriculture, the αl, l =
K,L, I, are such that αK + αL + αI = 1. Similar equations hold for the other sectors,
each with its own set of input cost shares (see Appendix A.1 for technical details). In the
interest of clarity and because it will make no appreciable difference empirically (see below),
I assume equal input cost shares across sectors in the sequel.
The implied elasticity of the wage for manual labor with respect to the agricultural price
index, Ŵ/P̂A, is given by
ψ =
βA + δβS
αL + αK
(3)
where the βi = Li/L are the sectoral labor shares and δ = P̂S/P̂A. Combining (2) and (3)
also gives
Π̂A/P̂A =
1
αK
(1− αLψ) . (4)
So the elasticity of the return on land with respect to the agricultural price index incorpo-
rates the direct (positive) effect of price changes on producer profits as well as the indirect
(negative) effect of price induced wage changes.
As for the intuition underlying equation (3), in the special case αI = βS = 0 it is extremely
simple: As food prices increase, the marginal value product of labor rises in agriculture,
drawing labor into farm-work from the other sectors (in this case, only manufacturing) until
equality of marginal value products across sectors is restored. The larger agriculture is in
10That is, for production function FA, total return or profit is ΠAKA = PAFA(LA, IA,KA)−PIIA−WLA.
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relation to nonagriculture, the greater has to be the exodus of labor from the latter sector
in proportional terms, the greater has to be the consequent rise in the value of the marginal
product of labor, and the greater, therefore, has to be the rise in the rural wage. Given
the Cobb-Douglas assumption,11 the wage elasticity exactly equals the relative size of the
agricultural sector, or βA. If αI > 0, then the wage-price elasticity exceeds βA. The
source of this amplification effect is the increase in intermediate input use induced by higher
agricultural prices, which boosts the marginal product of labor in agriculture and pulls even
more labor out of the other sectors.
The dependence of the wage-price elasticity on βS, in the more general case, has to do
with the endogeneity of the output price in the nontraded sector. A rise in the wage induced
by higher agricultural prices reduces the supply of services; it also can increase the demand
for services due to an income effect. Both forces put upward pressure on the price of services,
which reverses the aforementioned outflow of labor from that sector into agriculture. Thus,
the larger the service sector, the greater has to be manufacturing’s relative contribution to
the shift of labor into agriculture and, hence, the greater has to be the resulting rise in the
rural wage.
For given βS, the wage-price elasticity is also increasing in δ, the elasticity of the service
sector price with respect to the agricultural sector price. In general, δ depends on the price
and income elasticity of demand for services as well as on the response of aggregate income
y to increases in the agricultural price. In particular, I will assume that y consists of the
total return on land, manual labor earnings, and exogenous earnings, E, from nonmanual
labor such that12
y = ΠAKA +WL+ E. (5)
11See Appendix A.1. Although more general results can be derived using CES production functions (as
in Kovak, 2011), empirical implementation would require information on elasticities of factor substitution.
12Neither the returns to capital in manufacturing nor in services are assumed to accrue to rural households.
While ultimately for empirical convenience, this simplification is likely to be fairly innocuous.
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Appendix A.1 derives an explicit expression for δ in terms of the αl, βj, and the income
component shares for the case of a unitary-elastic demand for services (Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences).
One might, however, question the assumption that the demand for services responds
substantially to income changes over the five-year time-frame of my empirical analysis. That
is, stepping outside of the static model now, it may take some time before households behave
as if changes in income induced by agricultural price innovations are permanent. Under this
view, income effects on the demand for services can be zeroed out in solving for the wage-
price elasticity (see Appendix A.2). I denote this elasticity by ψSR to indicate its validity
(grosso modo) in the short-run wherein price-induced income changes are taken as transitory.
2.2 Segmented labor markets
Thus far I have maintained the assumption that workers can move costlessly between agricul-
ture, manufacturing, and services. Intuition suggests that restricted intersectoral mobility
of labor would limit spillover effects from changing agricultural prices, concentrating wage
gains within agriculture. To be precise, suppose that mobility costs are sufficiently high that
labor is effectively fixed in agriculture, though still mobile between manufacturing and ser-
vices. Agriculture and nonagriculture now each have a unique equilibrium wage. As I show
in Appendix A.3, the wage-price elasticity in agriculture is 1/(αL+αK) and in nonagriculture
is
ϕ =
δ′β′S
αL + αK
(6)
where δ′ = P̂S/P̂A and β′S = LS/(LS + LM) (note that, in general, δ
′ 6= δ and β′S > βS).
The key point here is that the magnitude of the intersectoral price spillover, reflected in the
elasticity ϕ, depends entirely on the structure of demand for services. How much manual
labor is drawn back into the service sector to accommodate the production increase induced
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by higher demand is directly related to β′S, the size of this sector relative to nonagriculture
as a whole.
If the demand for services is unresponsive to changes in income induced by higher agri-
cultural prices, as I have suggested might be the case in the short-run, then the segmented
model delivers a very sharp prediction. In this case, δ′ = 0 and, consequently, ϕSR = 0.
In other words, until (permanent) income effects kick in, there are zero inter-sectoral price
spillover effects in a segmented economy.
2.3 A taxonomy of wage-price elasticities
The theoretical framework yields wage-price elasticities as functions of input cost shares,
sectoral labor shares, and other parameters, all of which can be estimated from nationally
representative data collected by India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization (see
Appendix B for details). Table 1 summarizes the results of these calculations for 472
districts in 18 geographically contiguous states of India, containing the vast bulk of its rural
population.13
Columns 1-3 present wage-price elasticities implied by perfect sectoral mobility and
columns 4-6 the nonagricultural wage-price elasticities implied by labor market segmen-
tation. Thus, in column 1, the ψ from my baseline model, which assumes a unitary elastic
demand for services and equal input cost shares across sectors, averages 1.17 across dis-
tricts.14 Such high elasticities reflect large values of βA; for the average rural district,
around three-quarters of manual labor days (adjusted for efficiency units; see Appendix B.2)
are spent in agriculture. Statewise statistics on labor shares, per-capita expenditures, and
ψ are reported in Appendix Table C.1.
13Excluded are the peripheral states of Jammu/Kashmir in the far north and Assam and its smaller
neighbors to the north and east of Bangladesh. Included states, organized into five regions, are North:
Harayana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttaranchal; Northwest : Gujarat and Rajastan;
Center : Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa; East : Bihar, Jharkhand, and West
Bengal; South: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. See Appendix Table C.1.
14By contrast, the smattering of aggregate time-series evidence that exists for other countries suggests a
wage-food price elasticity somewhat less than unity (see Lasco et al., 2008, for a review).
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While it is straightforward to allow for sector-specific input cost shares using the results
in Appendix A.1, it hardly matters. Cost shares of value-added for Indian manufacturing
and service sectors based on national accounts are available from Narayan et al. (2012).
As seen in column 2, however, they yield virtually identical elasticity results as in the equal
shares case. While the labor cost share in manufacturing is, to be sure, much lower than that
in agriculture (and in services), so is the capital share. Hence, the ratio of capital to labor
shares, which is most relevant to the calculations, is actually quite similar across sectors.
The third column of Table 1 reports wage-price elasticities ignoring income effects on the
demand for services. As argued earlier, ψSR may provide the more realistic wage response
over relatively short horizons, such as the five-year period of my empirical analysis. Intu-
itively, suppressing income effects dampens the rise in the price of services that accompanies
higher agricultural prices. As a consequence, less labor needs to be diverted to the service
sector, so the rural wage does not have to rise as much. In the event, ψSR is 92 percent as
large, on average, as the baseline ψ.
In the remainder of Table 1, we see (col. 4) that segmented labor markets, under otherwise
identical assumptions, deliver a much smaller wage-price elasticity than the baseline model.15
The average value of ϕ across districts is only 0.45, again barely changing when the equal cost
shares assumption is relaxed (col. 5). For completeness, column 6 notes that ϕSR = 0. To
reiterate, if the income effect on the demand for nontradables is inoperative and labor markets
are segmented, then non-agricultural wages are completely unresponsive to agricultural price
changes.
2.4 Testing the theory
We have just seen that the wage-price elasticity, Ŵ/P̂A = ψ, is not a single number for all
of India, but rather varies by district according to, among other factors, the sectoral labor
15Recall that what matters in the calculation of ϕ is the importance of services relative to nonagricultural
manual labor (services + manufacturing). This services share, β′S , averages 0.67 across the 464 districts
with any nonagricultural manual labor (based on NSS64; see Appendix B.2).
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shares. In principle, one could estimate a separate ψ for each district, or perhaps for each
type of labor market, and compare the results to the ψ implied by the theory as summarized
in Table 1. In practice, however, this would require long time-series of wages and prices for
each district, which are unavailable. Nevertheless, I can do the next best thing by estimating
the regression analog to Ŵ/ψ = P̂A, or
∆wd/ψd = c+ γ
∑
j
sd,j∆pj + εd (7)
where c is an intercept, γ is a slope parameter, and εd is a disturbance term for each district
d.16 Under the null hypothesis γ = 1, the theory, along with its auxiliary assumptions,
can be said to hold true on average. Note that equation (7) simply replaces proportional
changes Ŵ and P̂A (cf., equation (1)) by their respective empirical counterparts. Thus, ∆wd
is the difference in log wages between years t − k and t and the ∆pj are the corresponding
time-differences in log prices of crop j. Which prices to use and the econometric issues that
arise from this choice are the main topic of Section 3.4.
Turning to segmented labor markets and to wages in the nonagricultural sector (NA), we
may write ŴNA/ψ = γP̂A, modifying the left-hand side of equation (7) accordingly. In this
case, γ reflects the degree of intersectoral labor mobility. Under the null of perfect mobility,17
γ = 1, which says that the price elasticity of nonagricultural wages, ϕ, is equivalent to the
price elasticity of wages in general, ψ. By contrast, under the segmented labor market
alternative, ŴNA/ϕ = P̂A, which is to say that γ = ϕ/ψ. Notice that the power of my
test of γ = 1 against this alternative depends on how far ϕ/ψ deviates from unity, larger
deviations being easier to detect in finite samples. In this regard, Table 1 provides some
cause for optimism; φ/ψ averages only 0.376 under unitary-elastic demand for services and
16An alternative to equation (7) would leave ψd on the right-hand side and estimate γ off of the interaction
between ψd and the price change variable. The downside of this approach is that, insofar as ψd is not perfectly
measured, it introduces an errors-in-variables problem.
17More precisely, this is the joint null that intersectoral labor mobility is perfect and that the model is
true (on average).
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may be as small as zero if income effects are negligible in the short-run (i.e., φSR/ψSR = 0).18
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Domestic agricultural markets
Since at least the 1960s, Indian governments, both at the national and state level, have
intervened extensively in agricultural markets. Interstate trade in foodstuffs is often severely
circumscribed through tariffs, taxes and licensing requirements (see Atkin, 2011, for a review)
with some states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh) going so far recently as to prohibit the exportation
of rice to other states (Gulati, 2012). The Government of India also sets minimum support
prices (MSPs) at which major food crops are, or at least can be, procured for eventual
release into the nationwide public distribution system (PDS). In practice, however, the level
of procurement, and thus the extent to which the MSPs are binding, varies greatly by crop
and state, and even within states (Parikh and Singh, 2007). The principal foodgrains, rice
and wheat, have, in recent years, been the overwhelming focus of government procurement
efforts, concentrated in the states of Punjab and Haryana, often for lack of storage capacity
and marketing infrastructure elsewhere. By contrast, procurement of pulses and oilseeds
has been minimal, as market prices have consistently exceeded MSPs.19
During and after the sharp run-up in international food prices in 2007-08, the Government
of India imposed export bans on rice, wheat, and a few other agricultural commodities in an
attempt to tamp down domestic price increases. Meanwhile, over several consecutive years,
MSPs for rice and wheat (and most other major crops) were raised substantially, partly in
18By contrast, the response of agricultural wages to food price changes would not provide an informative
test of perfect intersectoral mobility. In particular, consider ŴA/ψ = γP̂A. In the segmented case, ŴA/P̂A
averages 1.35, which is only 21 percent larger than the baseline ψ in column 1 of Table 1. In other words,
γ = ϕ/ψ averages around 1.21 under the segmentation alternative, which is relatively ‘close’ to 1 given
the standard errors we will be dealing with in Section 3. Hence, using agricultural wages, the null and
alternatives will be practically indistinguishable.
19See the reports by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices on http://cacp.dacnet.nic.in/ for
more details.
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response to international prices; huge stockpiles of foodgrains were subsequently accumulated
through government procurement (World Bank, 2010c; Himanshu and Sen, 2011).
The upshot of these interventions is that output prices faced by Indian agricultural pro-
ducers do not always perfectly track those in international markets.20 Moreover, since
domestic market integration is somewhat limited (especially in the case of rice), there is con-
siderable variability across states in crop price movements. On the one hand, this variation
may reflect differential transmission of exogenous price pressure (e.g., because of varying
levels of state procurement or exposure to trade, both with other countries and with other
states); on the other hand, it may reflect localized supply or demand shocks, which can also
drive rural wages directly.
3.2 Crop prices
Wholesale crop price data averaged at the state level from observations at several district
markets per state (and weighted by district production), are compiled by the Ministry of
Agriculture, as are production and area data at the district level. So as to focus on a period
of substantial price movement, as well as to match the NSS wage data (see below), I consider
state-level price changes between the 2004-05 and 2009-10 crop marketing seasons. Given
the relative ease of moving produce across district (as opposed to state) lines, state-level
wholesale prices seem the appropriate measure of farmer production incentives.21
I base the crop value shares, the sd,j in equation (7), on production data from the 2003-04
crop-year, which has the best district/crop coverage for the pre-2004-05 period. Value of
production is calculated at 2004-05 state-level prices. Note, however, that I do not take the
value-weighted sum of price changes across every single agricultural product grown in India.
Price data for many of the minor field crops and the tree crops are incomplete or not reliable.
20This is true for the principal intermediate input in agriculture as well. Despite a substantial upsurge in
the international prices of chemical fertilizers beginning in 2007, retail prices in India, which are set by the
central government, remained uniform and unchanged over the 2004-09 period (Sharma, 2012).
21Since sugarcane is sold mostly to mills and not in wholesale markets, I use the national MSP or, when
relevant, “State Advised Prices,” which tend to be much higher and, hence, closer to international cane
pricing standards (see Gulati, 2012).
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Moreover, the associated production data are often inaccurate (especially for vegetables and
tree products). I thus select major field crops according to the criteria that they cover at
least 1 percent of total cropped area nationally or that at least 5 districts had no less than
10 percent of their cropped area planted to them in 2003-4. These 18 crops, listed in Table 2
in descending order of planted area, comprise some 92 percent of area devoted to field crops
in 2003-04 in the major states of India.22 Table 2 also reports national average log-price
changes (weighted by the state share of total production) relative to rice. Thus, in the first
row, the relative price change for rice is zero, quite negative for several important crops (e.g.,
cotton, gram, groundnut, mustard/rapeseed) and highly positive for pulses (Urad, Moong,
and Arhar).
3.3 Wages
Wage data are derived from the NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS), normally
conducted every five years. The most recent round, the 66th, collected in 2009-10, is the
first conducted in the wake of the food price “crisis” of 2007-08, whereas the 61st round of
2004-05 most closely preceded it. Once again, in the spirit of the theoretical model, I focus
on manual labor, which constitutes nearly 83 percent of days of paid employment in rural
areas.23 The first-stage of the estimation takes individual log daily wages in the last week and
regresses them on district fixed effects as well as a quadratic in age interacted with gender.
Thus, I estimate the respective log-wage district fixed effects, wd,09 and wd,04, separately for
each round, removing, via the constant terms, year effects due to, e.g., general inflation.
22One could assume that minor crop prices did not change at all over the five-year period in question,
though this would still leave the problem of missing base-year minor-crop prices for calculating total crop
value shares. At any rate, the zero price change assumption seems untenable prima facie. More appealing
is to assume that the average change in minor crop prices is equal to the average change in major crop prices,
where averages are weighted by value shares within the respective crop category. Under this assumption,
the average of major crop prices weighted by major crop value shares (which is what I observe) is identically
equal to the average of all crop prices weighted by total crop value shares (which is what I require).
23The NSS-EUS categorizes jobs in terms of manual and non-manual labor only for rural, not urban,
workers. Based on the 61st round sample of nearly 39,000 individuals, the population-weighted proportions in
each category are as follows: 58% in manual-agricultural; 24% in manual nonagricultural; 18% in nonmanual
(virtually all in nonagriculture). For the 66th round sample of some 30,000 individuals, the corresponding
proportions are 51%, 30%, and 19%, respectively.
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Estimates of the standard errors of the fixed effects σ(wd,09) and σ(wd,04), which I use below
to construct regression weights, are obtained following the procedure of Haisken-DeNew and
Schmidt (1997).
3.4 Identification
Rewriting equation (7) to reflect the price data discussed above, I wish to estimate
∆wd/ψd = c+ γ
∑
j
sd,j∆pSTATEd,j + εd. (8)
where STATEd denotes the state in which district d is located. There are two endogene-
ity issues to contend with: measurement error and simultaneity between wage and price
changes.
As to the first issue, both the crop value shares, sd,j, and the crop-specific log-price
changes, ∆pSTATEd,j, may be measured with error. Putting aside the latter concern mo-
mentarily and assuming that measurement error is confined solely to value shares, I could
deploy the instrument
IV 1d =
∑
j
ad,j∆pSTATEd,j (9)
where ad,j is the area share of crop j in district d. To be sure, cropped areas may also be
measured with error, but these errors should not be correlated with those of crop production
and prices.
Clearly, IV 1d does not deal with measurement error in price changes, which could arise
if, e.g., the marketed varieties or grades of a certain crop in a certain state change over time.
Another concern is unobserved district-level shocks (or trends) correlated with both wage
and price changes. For instance, suppose that a particular district has been industrializing
relatively rapidly over the 2004-09 period, or that it has experienced comparatively rapid
technological improvement in agriculture. Both types of shocks would tend to raise district
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wages. And, they may influence crop prices as well insofar as the state’s agricultural markets
are insulated from the rest of India (and the world) and the district is important relative to
that market, or the shocks are strongly spatially correlated.
The next step, therefore, is to develop an instrument that is uncorrelated both with
district-level wage shocks and with measurement error in price changes (and crop value
shares). Consider, then,
IV 2d =
∑
j
ad,j∆pSTATEd,j (10)
where ∆pSTATEd,j is the production share weighted mean change in the log-price of crop j
across states excluding the state to which district d belongs.24 In other words, IV 2d replaces
the state price changes in IV 1d with a national average price change uncontaminated by
state-specific shocks or measurement error because no price data from that state or produc-
tion data from that district are used in its construction. The idea, then, is that ∆pSTATEd,j
reflects exogenous international price changes transmitted to other states of India as well as
shifts in demand and supply in the vast domestic market outside of the particular state.
A problem with IV 2d, however, is that it does not meet the exclusion restriction if the
εd are correlated across state boundaries. In other words, if industrialization or agricultural
innovation (or even weather) in, say, southern Andhra Pradesh and northern Tamil Nadu
move together, then the ∆pSTATEd,j for a district in Andhra Pradesh may reflect these
shocks inasmuch as price changes from Tamil Nadu contribute to the weighted average.
To deal with this concern, I first establish some notation: Let BSTATErd be the set of
states within a radius of r kilometers around district d; of course, STATEd ⊆ BSTATErd.
Thus, BSTATErd for the district in southern Andhra Pradesh, depending on r, may include
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (in addition to AP itself), whereas, if d were instead in northern
AP, BSTATErd might include Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh. With this definition, my
24To be precise, ∆pSTATEd,j =
∑
k∈STATECd ωkj∆pk,j , where STATE
C
d is the set of states excluding
STATEd and ωkj is state k’s share of total production of crop j among all states in STATE
C
d .
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instrument becomes
IV 3rd =
∑
j
ad,j∆pBSTATErd ,j (11)
where ∆pBSTATErd ,j is the production share weighted mean change in the log-price of crop
j across states excluding those in BSTATErd. Here, again, the logic is that the price
instrument should not directly, or, in this case, even indirectly, be driven by local shocks
that also determine differential wage growth across districts (and states).
The choice of r, the radius of “influence” of local wage shocks on prices in bordering
states may seem arbitrary. Since, on average, districts are 57 kilometers apart (centroid-to-
centroid), at r = 100 kilometers, the sets BSTATErd and STATEd differ only for districts
relatively close to their state’s border with another Indian state. Indeed, IV 3100d = IV 2d
for half of the 462 districts in my estimation sample (those in the deep interior of states or
along the coasts or international borders). By contrast, IV 3200d = IV 2d for fewer than 10
percent of sample districts. This suggests a strategy of comparing alternative estimates of
γ from equation (8) based on IV 3rd with successively higher values of r to determine at what
point increasing the radius of influence ceases to matter.
Finally, it should be evident from equation (11) that differences in price trends across
crops is key to identification; if the ∆pBSTATErd ,j are the same for all j, then IV 3
r
d collapses to
∆pBSTATErd , essentially a constant. Given the inclusion of the constant term c, γ is virtually
nonidentified in this scenario. Equally as important is variation in crop composition across
districts (see Table 2). If ad,j = aj for all d, then even if the ∆pBSTATErd ,j are not all
equal, IV 3rd again essentially collapses to a constant. Figure 1 illustrates the considerable
variation in
∑
j sd,j∆pSTATEd,j across the 462 sample districts (CV = 0.130), the obviously
more limited variation in IV 3200d (CV = 0.073), and the regression of the former variable on
the latter–i.e., my first-stage. The adjusted R2s of the first-stage regressions using IV 1d,
IV 2d, IV 3
100
d , and IV 3
200
d are, respectively, 0.788, 0.121, 0.103, and 0.091.
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3.5 Inference
As already alluded to, the error term εd is likely to be correlated across neighboring districts,
if only because geographically proximate regions experience similar productivity shocks over
time. I use a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator or spatial HAC (Conley, 1999) to
account for heteroskedasticity and spatial dependence. A familiar alternative to the spatial
HAC is the clustered covariance estimator. But clustering standard errors by state or region
assumes independence of errors across state or regional boundaries, a serious lacuna given
the large fraction of districts bordering an adjacent state.25
Bester et al. (2011) show that the asymptotic normal distribution, typically used to
obtain critical values for inference in HAC estimation, is a poor approximation in finite
samples. I thus follow their suggestion of bootstrapping the distribution of the relevant
test-statistics. For this reason, inference should be guided by p-values rather than standard
errors alone, although I will follow convention and report both. In particular, bootstrapped
p-values are much less sensitive than standard errors to choice of the tuning or bandwidth
parameter (i.e., the degree of kernel smoothing).26
Both numerator, ∆wd = wd,09 − wd,04, and denominator, ψd, of the dependent variable
in equation (8) are district-level summary statistics derived from micro-data. This gives rise
to a particular form of heteroskedasticity and renders least-squares estimation inefficient.
The standard solution is to use weighted least-squares, taking the inverse of the estimated
sampling variances as weights. While the sampling variance of ∆wd is σ
2(wd,09)+ σ
2(wd,04)
(see above), there is no equally straightforward ‘plug-in’ estimate of the sampling variance
of ψd. I, therefore, bootstrap this variance as well by drawing 1000 random samples of
individuals from each district’s original sample and computing ψd repeatedly. From these
25Also note that with only a single (five-year difference) observation per district, serial correlation is not
an issue in my set-up.
26Bandwidth here is the distance cutoff, in degrees of lat/long, beyond which spatial dependence is assumed
to die out. Based on simulation evidence from Bester et al. (2011), I choose a bandwidth of 16; i.e., given
the area of my ‘sampling region’ (the 18 major states of India), this choice should yield minimal test-size
distortion across a range of possible spatial correlations. I find these p-values to be highly robust to
bandwidth deviations of at least ±4.
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two components, then, I obtain the sampling variance of ∆wd/ψd using the delta-method.
27
3.6 Estimation results
Estimates of γ based on equation (8) are reported in Table 3. Across columns 1-5 of panel
(a), identifying assumptions become progressively less restrictive. Thus, column 1 estimates
are by ordinary (weighted) least squares, column 2 uses IV 1d as an instrument, column 3 uses
IV 2d, column 4 uses IV 3
100
d , and column 5 uses IV 3
200
d . While a comparison of the first two
columns suggests that measurement error in crop shares leads to a modicum of attenuation
bias, even the column 2 estimate is well below unity as indicated by the p-values from the
bootstrapped-based t-test of H0 : γ = 1.
28 Relaxing the assumption of no measurement
error or simultaneity bias in price changes in columns 3-5 delivers a γ̂ much closer to unity,
albeit one much less precisely estimated. The specifications in columns 4 and 5, however,
which allow shocks to be correlated across state borders, do not give much different results
from that of column 3, which ignores such correlation.
None of the p-values for H0 : γ = 1 in col. 3-5 are anywhere near rejection levels, evidence
in favor of my baseline specific-factors model. But how powerful is this test? Clearly, this
depends on the specific alternative under consideration. For instance, power will be low
against an otherwise identical model that ignores income effects in the demand for services;
the implied wage-price elasticities are simply too similar to distinguish these models (compare
cols. 1 and 3 of Table 1). To bring this point home, I reestimate the column 5 specification
replacing ∆wd/ψd with ∆wd/ψ
SR
d on the left-hand side and with regression weights altered
accordingly. Although the resulting estimate of γ, reported in column 6, is even closer to
one, it is also very close to its counterpart in column 5. Consequently, it is difficult to say
which of these versions of the specific factors model fits the data better on average.
27Although this procedure ignores correlation between numerator and denominator arising from the fact
that these two statistics are calculated from partially overlapping samples of the same underlying micro-data,
it should serve adequately as a first approximation.
28The p-value is the proportion of times the bootstrapped, re-centered, t-statistic of Bester et al. (2011)
exceeds the conventional t-statistic for the null in question computed for the original sample. I use 10,000
bootstrap replications.
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Power is higher against starker alternatives, such as that rural wages do not respond at
all to agricultural prices. More precisely, I can use the bootstrapped t-distribution to answer
the question: How likely would I have been to reject H0 : γ = 1 had the true γ been at or
very near zero? Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 plot empirical power functions over the range
of alternatives γ ∈ [0, 1] for the specifications in column 3 and 5, respectively. (Alongside are
the corresponding power functions based on the standard normal test-statistic; consistent
with Bester et al., 2011, the asymptotic approximation usually leads to over-rejection.)
These bootstrap-based power functions indicate that at a true γ of zero, H0 : γ = 1 would
be rejected with 95% certainty in the column 3 specification, and with closer to 90% certainty
in the column 5 specification. In this sense, then, power is reasonably good.
In sum, the evidence does not support the view that rural wages are unresponsive to
agricultural price changes over a half-decade period. Moreover, the magnitude of the wage
responses are consistent with at least one version of the specific factors model. Next, I assess
how this model fares against a particular alternative, that of segmented labor markets.
3.7 Test of sectoral labor mobility
To test perfect intersectoral mobility of labor, I use the same procedure described above to
construct log-wage district fixed effects for the 2004-05 and 2009-10 NSS-EUS rounds, except
in this case using only wage data for nonagricultural jobs. The dependent variable in panel
(b) of Table 3 is thus the time difference of these district fixed effects scaled by ψd. Relative
to the previous analysis, 17 districts are missing the dependent variable because of lack of
data on nonagricultural wage jobs and are thus dropped.
The estimates in columns 1-5 of panel (b) do not differ much from their counterparts
in panel (a), nor can I reject H0 : γ = 1 in the specifications with the least restrictive
identifying assumptions. While this non-rejection suggests that perfect mobility of manual
labor between agriculture and non-agriculture is a tolerable approximation for rural India,
the issue of power is again salient.
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Recall that, under the alternative hypothesis, γ = ϕ/ψ, which is the ratio of the wage-
price elasticity implied by segmented labor markets to that implied by unsegmented markets.
As seen in Table 1, γ averages 0.376 if income effects on the demand for services are operative
and zero otherwise. What is the likelihood that I would have detected a deviation away
from the null (towards zero) as large as γ = 0.376? Panel (c) of Figure 2 shows the power
function for γ based on the column 5 specification, indicating around a two-thirds chance of
rejecting H0 : γ = 1 at γ = 0.376. In other words, the wage-price elasticities implied by the
two alternative models are not sufficiently far apart to be distinguishable with near certainty
in my data.
By contrast, if the demand for services was unresponsive to changes in income induced
by higher agricultural prices over the five-year period in question (for reasons discussed at
the end of section 2.1), then ψSR is the relevant null elasticity. Reestimating the column 5
specification with ∆wd/ψ
SR
d as the dependent variable then leads to the γ̂ reported in column
6 and the corresponding power function in panel (d) of Figure 2. The upshot is that the
alternative of interest in this case is γ = φSR/ψSR = 0, against which my test has high power
(a 95% probability of rejection). Thus, provided that these income effects indeed did not
materialize, my data allow me to finely discriminate a model of perfect intersectoral labor
mobility from one of segmented markets.
3.8 Robustness: NREGA
India’s National Employment Rural Guarantee Act (NREGA), passed in 2005, provides ev-
ery rural household with 100 days of manual labor at a state-level minimum wage, which
is typically above the market wage. Phased in nationally beginning in 2006, NREGA, by
official counts, provided employment to 53 million households in 2010-11 over and above
existing public works programs. Imbert and Papp (2012), using NSS-EUS data and ex-
ploiting the gradual phase-in of the program, find that NREGA increased overall public
works employment while (modestly) raising private-sector wages in rural India. Since these
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labor market changes were contemporaneous with rising food prices, they are worth taking
seriously as possible confounding factors. Given my estimation strategy, however, NREGA
will only affect the results insofar as the local expansion of the program was systematically
related to the change in the agricultural price index or, rather, to the instrumental variable
for this change.
Based on 7-day employment recall information in the NSS-EUS, I compute the population
weighted mean of the fraction of days per week spent in public works employment (both
NREGA and other) for rounds 61 and 66.29 Including the 2004-09 change in this public
works employment variable (∆PW ) in regression (8) results in no appreciable changes in my
estimates of γ (compare cols. 5 and 7 of Table 3). Of course, the coefficient on ∆PW does
not necessarily reflect the causal impact of NREGA or any other public works employment
program in India on rural wages; this specification merely serves as a robustness check.
4 Food Prices and Welfare
4.1 Welfare elasticities
Now consider a rural household embedded within the economy sketched out in Section 2.
It has an endowment of farmland and of manual labor that it can supply to its own farm
(insofar as it has land) or to other farms, or to firms in the services or manufacturing
sectors. Household income is simply y in equation (5) with aggregate endowments replaced
by household endowments. Indirect utility is a function of this income and of prices, PM ,
PS, and Pj, j = 1, ..., c. Following the conventional derivation, the percent change in
29This is essentially the same variable considered by Imbert and Papp (2012). Across districts, the mean
days per week of public-works employment reported in 2004-05 was 0.0022, increasing to a still rather
minuscule 0.0144 days per week in 2009-10. Note, however, that NREGA employment is concentrated in
the agricultural off-season.
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money-metric utility m is
m̂ = λΠΠ̂A + λW Ŵ − νSP̂S −
∑
j
νjP̂j (12)
where λΠ and λW represent, respectively, the proportion of household income derived from
owned land and manual labor and νj and νS are, respectively, the crop j and services shares
of total consumption expenditures. Note that, while the last term in equation (12) is
standard in the literature, the penultimate term is typically overlooked (Porto, 2006, is a
notable exception).
To see how equation (12) accounts for the position of the household in the labor market,
consider the special case where λ = λΠ = 1− λW and focus only on the income-side compo-
nents of m̂, namely λΠ̂A + (1− λ)Ŵ . For a landless household, a net seller of labor, λ = 0
and the income effect is just Ŵ (wage increases are unambiguously good), whereas for a pure
rentier household, a net buyer of labor, λ = 1 and the income effect is Π̂A = (P̂A−αLŴ )/αK
(wage increases are unambiguously bad). For a household with 0 < λ < 1, the income ef-
fect of higher wages induced by higher food prices is positive (negative) so long as λ, the
household’s land income share, is less (greater) than αK/(αL + αK), the land income share
for the economy as a whole.
Substituting (1), (3), and (4), into (12), leads to
m̂ =
∑
j
(Ωsj − νj)P̂j (13)
where Ω = λΠ(1− αLψ)/αK + ψλW − δνS.
The term Ωsj − νj is similar to Deaton’s (1989) well-known net consumption ratio (revenue
minus expenditures on crop j divided by total consumption expenditures) except that, un-
like Deaton’s partial equilibrium result, it fully accounts for the changes in factor income
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induced by a given price change, as well as for changes in the price of nontradables. To
summarize, the price elasticity of money-metric utility varies across households according
to: (1) consumption shares, νj, including that of services, νS; (2) income shares due to land
(λΠ) and manual labor (λW ); and (3) sectoral labor shares, the βj (through ψ and δ), for
the district, or for the labor market more generally.
At a theoretical level, the welfare implications of a food price change look quite different
when labor markets are effectively segmented.30 In particular, the counterpart to equation
(13) has
Ω′ =
λA
αL + αK
+ ϕλNA − δ′νS, (14)
where λA is the share of income derived from agriculture (both from land and manual
labor) and λNA is the share of income derived from nonagricultural manual labor. Here,
obviously, the sector in which the household supplies its manual labor matters. Inasmuch
as ϕ < ψ < 1/(αL + αK), landless households working in agriculture stand to gain more
from higher food prices than those working outside of agriculture.
In what follows, I consider the distributional consequences of a uniform percentage in-
crease in all agricultural commodity prices relative to the price of manufactures, the nu-
meraire. According to equation (12), the elasticity of money-metric utility or household
welfare with respect to this price is simply  = Ω − νA, where νA is the expenditure share
of agricultural goods (essentially the food share); in the counterfactual segmented labor
markets scenario, ′ = Ω′ − νA.
4.2 Baseline results
Drawing on a sample of around 61,000 rural households in 472 districts of the 18 major states
from the nationally representative consumer expenditure survey (CES) collected as part of
30Artuc et al. (2010) make a similar point in the context of trade shocks using a dynamic model of costly
intersectoral labor mobility. Perfectly segmented labor markets can be viewed as an extreme case, retaining
the analytical convenience of a static model.
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the 2004-05 NSS round 61, I obtain the expenditure shares νA and νS, along with the baseline
welfare (per capita expenditure) level, for each household. Figure 3 plots these shares by
per capita consumption percentiles, showing, as might be expected, opposite patterns for
food and nontradables (services).31
In addition to the parameters that have already been discussed, I need income shares
for each household to compute Ω. Appendix B.3 describes the construction of the income
components from NSS household data and Figure 4 shows how the component shares vary
along the wealth distribution. Not surprisingly, manual labor earnings as a share of total
income decline steadily by percentile, whereas earnings from nonmanual labor and land
increase.
After combining all of these elements, I plot each household’s value of  against its per
capita expenditure percentile in 2004-05 to obtain the solid curve in Figure 5. The salient
feature of this welfare elasticity profile is that it is everywhere positive. Thus, rural Indian
households, both rich and poor, would benefit from higher food prices. But the profile is
also increasing in household wealth, paralleling the pattern seen in the proportion of income
derived from land (cf., Figure 4). So, while the welfare gain to the poorest is 0.25 percent
for every one percent increase in the agricultural price index, the welfare gain to the richest
is around 0.4 percent.32
How important are assumptions regarding intersectoral labor mobility? The lower dashed
curve in Figure 5, which plots ′ by percentile, provides the answer. In moving to a segmented
labor market, roughly a third of the gains to the very poorest households of higher agricul-
tural prices are wiped away, whereas the structure of labor markets hardly affects the welfare
gains of the richest households at all. The reason for this can be gleaned from Figure 4.
31Nontraded goods expenditure categories include: firewood and other local fuel, transport and travel,
tailoring expenses, house rental and related expenses, medical treatment expenses, education expenses,
remittances and gifts, recreation and leisure expenses, and taxes and fees.
32Results are qualitatively similar if I restrict price changes to rice and wheat, the dominant foodgrains
of India. In this case, RW = ΩsRW − νRW , where sRW and νRW are the shares of rice and wheat in
production and consumption, respectively. Appendix Figure C.1 shows that the benefits from higher prices
are not quite as great when the increases are confined to rice and wheat and, in particular, are substantially
less advantageous to the wealthy.
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The share of income from nonagricultural manual labor falls from nearly 30 percent among
the poorest to only around 10 percent among the richest. But, in the segmented model, the
wage paid to such labor is much less responsive to food prices than in the model with perfect
intersectoral mobility. In short, ruling out labor market segmentation empirically does have
consequences for how we think about the distributional effects of food price increases.
4.3 Public Distribution System
Assessing the role of the PDS in buffering price shocks provides a useful comparator as well
as being of interest in its own right. Under the PDS, eligible households (generally, those
below the poverty line) can purchase fixed rations of either rice, wheat, or sugar in “Fair
Price Shops” at below-market (but non-zero) prices. If PDS prices rise at the same rate as
non-PDS prices, then the above formula for  applies. However, insofar as PDS prices rise
more slowly than non-PDS prices, or do not rise at all, we need to adjust by
PDS = +
∑
j∈CPDS
θjνj,PDS (15)
where θj = 1− ∆pj,PDS∆pj and νj,PDS is the expenditure shares for PDS purchases of commodity
j evaluated at the PDS price. Thus, to take the extreme case, if all PDS prices stay fixed
while market prices rise, then instead of νA in the calculation of , one would use the food
share net of the PDS expenditure share. To get θj, I take the state mean unit values from the
NSS-CES for the respective commodity-types (PDS or non-PDS) in each successive round
(61st and 66th). Thus, my estimate of θj is the ratio of percentage changes between 2004-05
and 2009-10 of state mean unit values for PDS and non-PDS purchases of commodity j.
Median values of θj for rice, wheat, and sugar across the 18 major states are all close to
unity, which means that PDS prices were indeed quite stable over this five-year period.
The proportion of rice, wheat, and sugar consumption accounted for by the PDS generally
increased between 2004-05 and 2009-10 (Appendix Figure C.2). No doubt, this reflects the
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response of government, both central and state, to the food-price crisis of 2007-08, as PDS
coverage was expanded (Khera, 2011), though take-up of the existing program may have
also increased. Since 2004-05 is the base year for the welfare analysis, I initially compute
νj,PDS from NSS61-CES data to reflect PDS coverage circa 2004-05. However, to address
PDS coverage expansion, I also calculate for each PDS commodity j and decile of per-capita
expenditures q within each state s the ratio Rj,s,q of average PDS expenditures in 2009 to
average PDS expenditures in 2004. Adjusting for 2009-10 PDS coverage is, then, just a
matter of multiplying νj,PDS in equation (15) by the Rj,s,q corresponding to that household’s
state and decile.33
The quantitative implications of these adjustments are shown in Figure 5. PDS coverage
circa 2004-05 leads to a substantial “improvement” in the welfare elasticity for the poorest
two or three deciles. When higher 2009-10 PDS coverage is factored in, the elasticity
profile shifts up again ever so slightly, but only for the bottom two deciles. Although the
PDS evidently plays a significant role in protecting the welfare of the rural poor, even the
distributional effects of this giant safety net scheme are dwarfed by those of the rural wage
channel, as we will see next.
4.4 General versus partial equilibrium
Partial equilibrium welfare analysis assumes that ψ = δ = 0 so that, from equation (13), Ω =
λΠ/αK − νA. Since λΠ/αK is equivalent to the ratio of crop revenue to total consumption,34
Ω−νA is just the net consumption ratio, Deaton’s (1989) justly celebrated workhorse. Figure
6 compares the partial equilibrium welfare elasticity profile (dashed curve) to the general
equilibrium case already discussed. In partial equilibrium, the poorest rural households in
India would experience a welfare loss of around 0.3 percent for a 1 percent uniform increase
in agricultural prices. But the distributional gradient is very steep, so much so that the top
33To be clear, while NSS66-CES provides household-level data on PDS consumption from 2009-10, these
are not the same households as in the NSS61-CES of 2004-05. Thus, to keep 2004 as the base-year, I need
to impute to this latter sample of households what their 2009 PDS coverage would have been.
34This is because λΠ/αK = ΠAKA/yαK = PAYA/C, where C is household consumption.
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30 percent of rural households would gain from the price increase, and those households at
the very top would gain by more, in percentage terms, than the poorest households would
lose.
Among the poor, the chasm between partial and general equilibrium welfare elasticities
is enormous (note the difference in scale vis a` vis Figure 5). Income from land, which
incorporates the direct return to higher crop prices, is concentrated in top half of the wealth
distribution in rural India, whereas income from manual labor dominates for the bottom
half. So, it is the poor in particular whose welfare is most sensitive to changes in wages for
manual labor. In general equilibrium, improved terms of trade for the agricultural sector is
like the proverbial rising tide that lifts all boats; every rural income group comes out ahead,
albeit through different channels.
5 Conclusions
In reaction to the food price spike of 2007-08, the Government of India imposed export bans
on certain major crops. Such efforts to restrain consumer prices can have the unfortunate
side-effect of restraining producer prices as well. My analysis shows that, in the face of
higher agricultural commodity prices, a stand-alone export ban, or any policy that mimics
its effects, would reduce welfare for the vast bulk of India’s population. Moreover, it is
precisely the poorest rural households (and, hence, the poorest in India as a whole) that
are most harmed by forestalling, or at least delaying, the substantial trickle-down effects of
higher crop prices.
Looking over a period of unusually large and diverse agricultural commodity price in-
creases, I find a highly elastic nominal wage response in rural areas of India, with ample
spillover effects on nonagricultural wages as well. Consequently, partial equilibrium analysis,
which assumes fixed wages, would provide a highly misleading picture of the distributional
impacts of food price shocks among India’s vast rural population.
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To be sure, the story may be quite different in metropolitan India, where the poor,
arguably, benefit little from rising rural wages.35 Even though not much more than a quarter
of India’s population resides in cities, urban constituencies are obviously more concentrated
than rural ones and, hence, from a political-economy standpoint, are likely to be more pivotal
in shaping government policy on such matters as food security.
Finally, this paper speaks to the broader debate on the link between trade and poverty.36
Consistent with the WTO’s Doha agenda, my results imply that lowering barriers to trade
in agricultural goods on the part of developed countries, if only by improving the lot of the
rural poor in India, can make a significant dent in global poverty.
35A full analysis of rural-urban labor market linkages is beyond the scope the present paper, but is an
important topic for future research.
36The evidence on the impact of India’s own tariff reform during the 1990s is mixed. Topalova’s (2010)
ex-post analysis finds that rural poverty rose and agricultural wages fell in districts exposed to larger tariff
reductions, although the main agricultural commodities are assumed to be nontradable over the reform
period. By contrast, Marchand (2012) finds a negative relationship between unskilled wages in rural areas and
industry-specific tariff rates, including those in agriculture, and an ex-ante analysis of household consumption
suggests that the fall in trade barriers during the 1990s would have reduced rural poverty in India.
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Table 1: A Taxonomy of Wage-Price Elasticities
All manual labor Nonagricultural manual labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage-price elasticity 1.174 1.175 1.093 0.450 0.453 0.000
(0.196) (0.199) (0.242) (0.223) (0.265) (0.000)
Ratio to column (1) 1.000 1.000 0.924 0.376 0.378 0.000
(0.000) (0.011) (0.069) (0.191) (0.192) (0.000)
Symbol ψ — ψSR ϕ — ϕSR
Assumptions:
Intersectoral mobility Yes Yes Yes No No No
Income effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Sectoral input cost shares equal Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Notes: Means (standard deviations) of district-level data. Sample size for columns (1)-(3) is 472 districts
and for columns (4)-(6) is 464 districts. Sector-specific input cost shares for manufacturing and services
come from the GTAP-8 database (Narayan et al., 2012) and are for the whole of India.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Major Crops
Area Share Value Share No. of Districts ∆pj −∆price
Rice 0.380 0.408 447 0.000
(0.320) (0.328)
Wheat 0.225 0.199 390 -0.032
(0.183) (0.165)
Soyabean 0.092 0.099 153 0.056
(0.151) (0.159)
Bajra 0.076 0.037 287 -0.064
(0.146) (0.091)
Cotton 0.076 0.128 206 -0.130
(0.112) (0.175)
Maize 0.067 0.054 410 -0.011
(0.112) (0.103)
Jowar 0.065 0.024 317 -0.041
(0.110) (0.040)
Ragi 0.052 0.030 192 0.052
(0.123) (0.092)
Groundnut 0.046 0.050 349 -0.112
(0.115) (0.115)
Gram 0.043 0.045 385 -0.195
(0.072) (0.087)
Sugarcane 0.035 0.090 386 0.001
(0.082) (0.164)
Rapeseed/Mustard 0.034 0.038 367 -0.199
(0.073) (0.090)
Urad 0.028 0.012 409 0.364
(0.042) (0.018)
Moong 0.025 0.014 424 0.586
(0.041) (0.030)
Arhar 0.021 0.019 428 0.253
(0.033) (0.033)
Potato 0.019 0.053 312 -0.146
(0.061) (0.105)
Sunflower 0.014 0.009 271 -0.083
(0.048) (0.032)
Sesamum 0.012 0.008 387 0.053
(0.022) (0.022)
Notes: Means (standard deviations) of district-level data and number of districts growing each crop in
2003-04. Log-price changes for 2004-09 are averages across the 18 major states of India weighted by
state production shares.
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Table 3: Rural Wage Impacts of Crop Price Changes: 2004-09
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Wages for all manual labor (N = 462)
γ 0.426 0.540 0.846 0.803 0.827 0.918 0.826
(0.098) (0.103) (0.301) (0.297) (0.313) (0.325) (0.314)
∆ PWa 0.034
(0.209)
p-values:
H0 : γ = 1 0.000 0.007 0.635 0.549 0.634 0.836 0.633
H0 : γ = 0 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.019
(b) Wages for nonagricultural manual labor (N = 445)
γ 0.665 0.767 0.975 0.888 0.830 0.891 0.835
(0.105) (0.101) (0.260) (0.247) (0.242) (0.246) (0.246)
∆ PWa -0.229
(0.233)
p-values:
H0 : γ = 1 0.006 0.318 0.938 0.709 0.562 0.703 0.580
H0 : γ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.011
Instrument — IV 1d IV 2d IV 3
100
d IV 3
200
d IV 3
200
d IV 3
200
d
Notes: Standard errors robust to spatial dependence in parentheses. All p-values based on Bester et
al. (2011) bootstrapped critical values (R = 10000). Dependent variable is the change in log wage
district fixed effect between 2004-09 scaled by the district wage-price elasticity (ψ in cols. (1)-(5)
and (7), ψSR in col. (6)). All regressions include a constant term and are weighted by the inverse
estimated sampling variance of the dependent variable. See text for definition of instruments.
aDifference in average days of public works employment per week in district between 2004-09.
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Appendix
A Model Solution
A.1 Baseline case
I assume Cobb-Douglas production functions with input cost shares αLi + αIi + αKi = 1 in
each sector i = A,M, S . The first step is to solve the following system of four equations
αLAŴ + αKAΠ̂A = P̂A (A.1)
αLMŴ + αKM Π̂M = 0
αLSŴ + αKSΠ̂S = P̂S
βAΠ̂A + βM Π̂M + βSΠ̂S = Ŵ
for Ŵ and the Π̂i (recall, P̂M = P̂I = 0 by assumption). The first three equations are the
sectoral price-equals-unit-cost conditions, whereas the last equation is derived from the labor
constraint (which implies
∑
i βiL̂i = 0) and the fact that L̂i = Π̂i − Ŵ in the Cobb-Douglas
case.
The solution for the wage-price elasticity is
Ŵ/P̂A = (βA/αKA + βSδ/αKS)/D, (A.2)
where D = 1 +
∑
i βiαLi/αKi. In the case of equal input cost shares across sectors, D =
1 + αL/αK and equation (A.2) reduces to equation (3) in the text.
Solving for the elasticity of the services sector price with respect to the agricultural sector
price, δ, involves equating changes in service sector supply ŶS and demand X̂S. Suppose
that the Marshallian demand function for services takes the form XS = y/PS, where y is
given in equation (5).37 Thus,
X̂S = ŷ − P̂S (A.3)
= λΠΠ̂A + λW Ŵ − P̂S
= λΠP̂A/αKA + (λW − αLAλΠ/αKA)Ŵ − P̂S
37Implied by Cobb-Douglas preferences, this functional form delivers a unitary income elasticity of demand
for services. Engel curve estimation based on the NSS61-CES indicates an actual income elasticity of 1.19.
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where the third line uses equation (4). Note that the land and manual labor shares of
income, λΠ and λW respectively, are for the economy as a whole rather than for a particular
household, as in section 4.
On the supply-side, from the services production function and the specificity of capital,
we have
ŶS = αLSL̂S + αIS ÎS. (A.4)
Meanwhile, the condition that input prices equal respective marginal value products delivers
Ŵ = P̂S + F̂LS = P̂S − L̂S + ŶS and P̂S = −F̂IS = ÎS − ŶS, where the second equality in
each case follows from the total differentiation of the marginal product functions FLS and
FIS . Solving these two equations, after first substituting out ÎS from the second using (A.4),
yields
ŶS =
αLS + αIS
αKS
P̂S − αLS
αKS
Ŵ . (A.5)
Substituting equation (A.2) into both (A.3) and (A.5) and equating the two gives
δ =
αKS(λΠD + βAC)
αKA(D − βSC) (A.6)
where C = αLS/αKS − αLAλΠ/αKA + λW . With equal input cost shares, equation (A.6)
simplifies to δ = (λΠ + βAC˜)/(1− βSC˜), where C˜ = [αKλW + αL(1− λΠ)]/(αK + αL).
A.2 No income effects
To derive ψSR, I zero out income effects on the demand for services by modifying equation
(A.3) to read X̂S = −P̂S. Following the steps above, in the equal cost shares case, I get
δ = βA/(1 + αL/αK − βS); ψSR follows from equation (3).
A.3 Segmented labor market
Allowing for separate agricultural and nonagricultural wages, the system of equations (A.1)
becomes
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αLAŴA + αKAΠ̂A = P̂A (A.7)
αLMŴNA + αKM Π̂M = 0
αLSŴNA + αKSΠ̂S = P̂S
(1− β ′S)Π̂M + β
′
SΠ̂S = ŴNA.
Since L̂A = 0, Π̂A = ŴA, which gives ŴA/P̂A = 1/(αLA+αKA) by the first of these equations.
The solution to the second through fourth equations implies
ŴNA/P̂A = β
′
Sδ
′/αKSD′, (A.8)
where D′ = 1 +
∑
i6=A β
′
iαLi/αKi. Again, under equal input cost shares, equation (A.8)
simplifies to equation (6) in the text. Replacing Ŵ with ŴNA in equation (A.5) and equating
to equation (A.3), as before, yields a solution for δ′.
B Parameters computed from NSS data
B.1 Input cost shares in agriculture
The 59th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS59) collected nationally representative
farm household data in 2002-03, which includes information on agricultural inputs and out-
puts for over 40 thousand farms. The labor cost share is αL = W (`h + `f )/
∑
j PjYj, where
`h and `f are, respectively, hired and family labor in agriculture and the denominator is the
value of crop production. We may write the numerator as W`h(1 + f), where f = `f/`h is
the ratio of family to hired labor. For a labor market in equilibrium, f should equal the ratio
of the number of agricultural laborers working on their own farm to the number working for
wages on other farms. Thus, we can calculate f for each of the five regions (north, north-
west, center, east, and south) from individual employment data in NSS61-EUS. Comparable
data on hired labor expenses (for regular and casual farm workers), W`h, and on total value
of crop production are available at the farm-level by season from NSS59. Summing up W`h
across seasons and households within each region (using sampling weights) multiplying by
(1 + f) and dividing by a similarly computed sum of production value gives the regional la-
bor shares. I use the same approach for the intermediate input shares αI = PIIA/
∑
j PjYj,
where the numerator is the total expenditures on non-labor variable inputs as reported in
NSS59 (seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and irrigation). The following table reports the results of
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these calculations.
North Northwest Center East South
αL 0.331 0.304 0.258 0.317 0.260
αI 0.264 0.325 0.258 0.250 0.238
B.2 Sectoral labor shares
Despite being a so-called ‘thin’ round, NSS64, collected in 2007-08, fielded the standard
Employment-Unemployment Survey questionnaire on a ‘thick’-round sample of nearly 80
thousand rural households. I use these data to compute district-level sectoral labor shares
at roughly the mid-point between 2004-05 and 2009-10. Since the survey was carried out
throughout the whole year in most districts, agricultural labor seasonality is not a major
issue at the district level. For each individual, I compute the total manual labor days in
the last week in both agricultural and nonagricultural jobs, apportioning the latter (based
on industry codes) between services and manufacturing sectors. I then take a population-
weighted sum of days across individuals in each district to get total district labor days (per
week) by sector, Dd,m, m = MA (manual ag. labor), MNA (manual nonag. labor), and
MNAS (manual nonag. labor in services).
There is a persistent daily wage gap between agriculture and nonagriculture, present
across all NSS-EUS rounds, which suggests that days spent in agriculture are substantially
less productive than those spent in nonagriculture. In particular, an agricultural sector
dummy included in a log-wage regression using the NSS64 rural sample attracts a coefficient
of -0.243, after controlling flexibly for gender, age, education, and district. Thus, labor pro-
ductivity is around 24 percent lower per day in agriculture. To account for this productivity
difference, I incorporate an efficiency units assumption into the model. In other words, the
labor constraint becomes L = L′A + LM + LS, where L
′
A = LAe
−0.243. The district-level
sectoral labor shares, in efficiency units, can hence be calculated using
βd,A =
e−0.243Dd,MA
e−0.243Dd,MA +Dd,MNA
and βd,S =
Dd,MNAS
e−0.243Dd,MA +Dd,MNA
.
B.3 Household income components
The proportion, n, of economically active household members (age 15-60) is imputed from
NSS61-EUS to each household in the NSS61-CES (conditional on having members in the
age range) based on regressions with the following explanatory variables: linear splines in
the amount of land the household cultivates, household demographic composition and age
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of head, proportion of household members with different education levels, social category of
household (scheduled caste/tribe), and district dummies. The small percentage of house-
holds for whom the imputed value n̂ is zero or less are dropped.
Daily wage income per worker is the weighted sum of (exponentiated) state fixed effects
from a log-wage regression based on NSS-EUS61; the fixed effects are adjusted by the dummy
coefficients for the sector of employment. Weights are the imputed proportion of household
days worked (in last week) in agricultural manual labor, non-agricultural manual labor,
and non-manual labor using the same imputation procedure as for n̂. Thus, we have
adjusted state mean daily wages W s,m, for m = MA, MNA, and NM (non-manual) and the
corresponding household weights (days) d̂m. Annual per capita income from labor of type m
is ι̂m = 365n̂d̂mW s,m. Thus, in terms of equation (5) in the text, we have WL = ι̂MA+ ι̂MNA
and E = ι̂NM .
To obtain ΠAKA, I use the fact that the value of farmland represents the expected present
value of the stream of returns; thus, ΠA is the per unit value of land times the discount rate.
Data on the value, area, and irrigation status of over 90 thousand plots come from NSS59
(see B.1). The sum of state mean land values per hectare for irrigated and unirrigated
land, weighted by hectares of the respective type of land owned (per household member)
constitutes total value of the household land endowment per capita. Multiplying this latter
figure by the discount rate of 0.05 yields the final component of y at the household level.
C Additional figures and tables
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics for Major States of India
Annual PC Expend. ψ βA βS βM No. of districts
North:
Haryana 4.559 1.214 0.785 0.142 0.073 19
(0.817) (0.125) (0.138) (0.111) (0.081)
Himachal Pradesh 4.094 1.207 0.772 0.165 0.063 12
(0.551) (0.090) (0.120) (0.095) (0.049)
Punjab 4.535 1.201 0.731 0.203 0.067 17
(0.891) (0.100) (0.160) (0.135) (0.041)
Uttaranchal 3.296 1.220 0.761 0.187 0.052 13
(0.474) (0.136) (0.180) (0.147) (0.058)
Uttar Pradesh 3.108 1.217 0.781 0.149 0.070 70
(0.596) (0.117) (0.124) (0.090) (0.068)
Northwest:
Gujarat 3.136 1.328 0.835 0.088 0.078 25
(0.579) (0.161) (0.136) (0.084) (0.093)
Rajasthan 3.317 1.318 0.758 0.168 0.075 31
(0.503) (0.093) (0.091) (0.073) (0.057)
Center:
Chattisgarh 2.244 1.270 0.870 0.092 0.038 13
(0.481) (0.071) (0.113) (0.093) (0.041)
Madhya Pradesh 2.489 1.271 0.860 0.104 0.035 45
(0.608) (0.079) (0.117) (0.103) (0.050)
Maharashtra 2.752 1.221 0.825 0.118 0.057 33
(0.558) (0.126) (0.120) (0.071) (0.058)
Orissa 1.964 1.152 0.759 0.151 0.090 30
(0.557) (0.128) (0.137) (0.114) (0.076)
East:
Bihar 2.408 1.203 0.802 0.142 0.055 37
(0.391) (0.146) (0.167) (0.126) (0.068)
Jharkhand 2.257 1.068 0.697 0.210 0.093 18
(0.441) (0.267) (0.243) (0.210) (0.073)
West Bengal 2.667 0.982 0.603 0.223 0.174 17
(0.363) (0.192) (0.139) (0.075) (0.113)
South:
Andhra Pradesh 2.486 1.090 0.717 0.174 0.109 22
(0.308) (0.069) (0.090) (0.099) (0.052)
Karnataka 2.595 1.163 0.828 0.094 0.078 27
(0.593) (0.203) (0.176) (0.081) (0.117)
Kerala 4.355 0.698 0.370 0.458 0.172 14
(0.877) (0.284) (0.223) (0.172) (0.096)
Tamil Nadu 2.386 0.928 0.588 0.225 0.187 29
(0.369) (0.225) (0.174) (0.114) (0.139)
Notes: Means (standard deviations) of district-level data. Annual per capita expenditures are in thou-
sands of 2004 Rupees.
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